Party Nomination Strategy and its Representational Consequences in Interactive Mixed-Member Majoritarian Systems
Abstract
I argue that interactive mixed-member majoritarian systems (interactive MMMs), a variant of mixed member systems where parties can nominate the same candidates in both majoritarian and PR tiers (dual listing), diminish the representational advantages commonly associated with PR systems. Analyzing comprehensive, candidate-level data of Japan’s lower house elections, I show that parties give higher list ranks to senior candidates, incumbents, and dual-listed candidates under the interactive MMM. Furthermore, incumbents are more likely to be dual-listed than non-incumbents. These patterns apply across parties, but are less applicable to situations of intra-party disputes and government transitions, where seniors and incumbents may give their way to newcomers. My analysis suggests that interactive MMMs sustain representational inequalities between groups by reducing the electoral prospects of newcomers and making legislative turnover less frequent.
Note
This paper was previously entitled “Youth Underrepresentation and Parties’ Nomination Strategy in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems”. It was presented at the 2024 Summer Meeting of the Japanese Society for Quantitative Political Science (JSPQS) and the 2024 APSA Annual Meeting.