

Gendered Candidate Turnover?

Relationships among Candidates' Gender, Ideology, and Reelection
Bid

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Outline

- 1 Overview
- 2 Thoretical Expectation
 - Literature Review
 - Hypotheses
- 3 Data and Method
- 4 Result
- 5 Discussion and Conclusion
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Overview

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- **Contribution**
 - Level playing field might promote female representation in the long run.

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Literature Review: Little focus on Heterogeneity

- **Literature RQ1 (General): Are females less likely to run for election again?**
 - Less likely in the US (Lawless, 2005; Lazarus et al., 2023).
 - Mixed evidence in other countries / elections (Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa, 2014; Weber et al., 2023).

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- **Literature RQ2 (Conditional): Under what conditions are females less likely to run for election again?**
 - Understudied!
 - Exceptions focusing on the condition of WM (Folke and Rickne, 2016; Muyters et al., 2022; Peveri and Sangnier, 2023; Slegten and Heyndels, 2022)

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- **Our RQ (from RQ2): Are female novices more likely to exit than male novices?**
 - **Why novices?:** A “least-likely case”.
 - **What condition?:** Ideology and motivation.

H1 (Unconditional)

Female novices are less likely to rerun than male novices.

- Social norms are more likely to sanction female legislators than male ones (Campbell and Childs, 2014; Johansson Sevä and Öun, 2019; Silbermann, 2015).
- Female novices are exposed to societal expectations and thus are more likely to exit than male novices (Hjelmar et al., 2010).

H2 (Conditional)

Ideologically extreme female novices are less likely to rerun than their male counterparts.

- Female legislators place a larger emphasis on consensus building than male legislators (Dingler and Ramstetter, 2023; Kennedy, 2003; Volden et al., 2013).
- Deviation within the group would affect female novices more than male novices.

H3 (Conditional)

Female novices who are less active in parliament are less likely to rerun than their male counterparts.

- Legislative activities might affect legislators' career decisions.
- **Existing evidence.** Gender gap in the amount of legislative activities (Bäck and Debus, 2019; Schmitt and Brant, 2019; Vallejo Vera and Gómez Vidal, 2022).
- Female legislators might be more likely to exit because of their outsider positions in parliament.

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- **Country and Party:** France; LREM
 - Electoral System: SMD with two rounds
 - Parity law: Introduced in 2000, but with little effect (Murray, 2009; Southwell, 2014).
 - LREM: Formed by Emmanuel Macron; Centrist Party.
- **Timing:** General Election in 2022
 - Macron was elected as president and had a major victory in the 2017 general election.
 - Gender-balanced novices elected in 2017.
 - Novices' first general election as incumbents in 2022.

LREM Novices in the 15th French National Assembly ($N = 197$).

- Legislators' Career data (Ollion, 2019, 2021)
 - Novice status.
- French National Assembly data.
 - Voting record for the 15th National Assembly.
- Election data.
 - General Election Data: 2017 and 2022.
 - Legislators' identities, e.g., gender.

- **DV.** Rerunning bid in the 2022 election (any / same party)
 - NAs for those who died during the term.
- **IV.**
 - Female dummy.
 - Intra-party ideological extremity.
 - Total attendance in the term.
 - Female \times Ideology; Female \times Attendance.
- **Control.**
 - Age.
 - Winning margin in the 2017 election.
 - Department in the 2017 election.

- **Main Model:** Logistic regression.
 - SEs clustered at department.
- **Estimation of ideology:** Ideal point estimation
 - Estimated via R's emIRT (Imai et al., 2016).
 - Total N of votes: 4419.
 - “Pour” - 1, “Non” - 0, others - NA.
 - **Note.** *Suppléant* in the French National Assembly (Andrews, 1962).
 - MPs cannot hold certain public offices. They must be replaced by pre-determined *suppléants* if they are appointed to governmental offices.
 - We replace MPs' voting records with those of suppléants while they are absent.

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Descriptive Result

- 80 % of female and male novices reran in 2022.
- Little gender difference in estimated ideology and attendance.
 - See Figure 4 in the appendix.
- Age and winning margin are also balanced.

	Type	Statistic			
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Reelection Bid	All (197)	0.8	0.4	0	1
	Male (87)	0.8	0.4	0	1
	Female (110)	0.8	0.4	0	1
Ideology	All	0.6	0.6	0.002	3.6
	Male	0.6	0.6	0.002	3.6
	Female	0.6	0.6	0.01	3.3
Age	All	43.9	10.3	24	70
	Male	43.2	10.3	25	67
	Female	44.5	10.2	24	70
Attendance	All	917.9	361.2	213	2280
	Male	854.8	339.8	229	1644
	Female	967.9	371.1	213	2280
Margin	All	15.8	10.6	0.2	59.5
	Male	16.4	12.2	0.2	59.5
	Female	15.2	9.1	1.4	43.4

Note. Summary statistics for the LREM novices elected in the second round of the 2017 election. Ideology is the absolute value of the standardized estimate. Margin of victory is the difference in vote share with the runner-up.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Main Result

H1

Women are less likely to rerun than men.

	Any party		Same party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	1.28*** (0.26)	17.85*** (1.82)	0.97*** (0.24)	-20.96*** (1.60)
Female	-0.15 (0.34)	-0.06 (0.66)	-0.07 (0.32)	-0.19 (0.67)
Ideology		-0.72 (0.45)		-1.88* (0.85)
Age		-0.04 (0.04)		-0.04 (0.04)
Attendance		0.00 (0.00)		0.00* (0.00)
Winning Margin		0.09* (0.04)		0.07 (0.04)
Department Dummy	No	Yes	No	Yes
AIC	217.93	271.91	239.14	279.57
BIC	224.50	534.56	245.70	542.22
Log Likelihood	-106.96	-55.95	-117.57	-59.78
Deviance	213.93		235.14	
Num. obs.	197		197	

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Note. Standard errors are clustered at department when including department FE.

Table 2: Regression Result for Hypothesis 1

H1

Women are less likely to rerun than men.

- Not supported.

H2

Ideologically extreme female novices are less likely to rerun than their male counterparts.




Figure 1: No Gender Difference in the Marginal Effect of Ideology.

H2

Ideologically extreme female novices are less likely to rerun than their male counterparts.

- Not supported.
- Ideologically extreme novices are less likely to seek reelection from the same party, **regardless of gender**.

H3

Female novices who are less active in parliament are less likely to rerun than their male counterparts.




Figure 2: No Gender Difference in the Marginal Effect of Attendance.

H3

Female novices who are less active in parliament are less likely to rerun than their male counterparts.

- Not supported.
- No gender difference in the effect of attendance on reelection bids.

- **Concern:** Interaction between Ideology (H2) and Motivation (H3)?
 - Extremists might first become inactive and then give up rerunning.
 - Previous models did not explicitly model this possibility.
- **Approach:** Add a three way interaction to the main model.




Figure 3: No Gender Difference in the Effect of Attendance, Conditional on Ideology.

- **Concern:** Interaction between Ideology (H2) and Motivation (H3)?
 - Extremists might first become inactive and then give up rerunning.
 - Previous models did not explicitly model this possibility.
- **Approach:** Add a three way interaction to the main model.
- **Result:** No gender difference in the interaction.
 - Also see Figure 5 in the appendix.

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- **The Effect of Electoral System**

- **Literature.** Focuses on PR / SMD in the US; Female legislators in SMD are less likely to rerun (than in PR) (Smrek, 2020; Lawless, 2005; Weber et al., 2023)
- **Our research.** A non-US SMD case; Female novices have a larger incentive to continue their career in a balanced environment.

- **The Effect of Electoral System**

- **Literature.** Focuses on PR / SMD in the US; Female legislators in SMD are less likely to rerun (than in PR) (Smrek, 2020; Lawless, 2005; Weber et al., 2023)
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- **Positioning of LREM**

- Center Party: Not particularly favorable to women.
- Macron tends to detour parliament. Legislators had little influence on legislation.

Conclusion

- **Argument:** Female novices are as motivated as male novices to continue political career when parliament is gender-balanced.
- **Mechanism:** No gender differences in the effects of motivation after entering parliament or ideological alienation.
- **Implication:** Increasing the entry of women might improve female descriptive representation.

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


Figure 4: LREM novices are gender-balanced in terms of ideology / attendance.




Figure 5: No apparent gender difference in the level of attendance for extremists (w/ ideology > intra-party mean + 1 std. dev.).